Environmental Law by Lewis, Browne C
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship
Summer 2006
Environmental Law
Browne C. Lewis
Cleveland State University, b.c.lewis@csuohio.edu
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
research.services@law.csuohio.edu.
Original Citation
Browne Lewis, Environmental Law, 52 The Wayne Law Review 637 (Summer 2006)
? ???? ?????
Citation: 52 Wayne L. Rev. 637 2006 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Thu Dec  5 18:02:28 2013
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0043-1621
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 52 SUMMER 2006 NUMBER 2B
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
BROWNE LEWISt
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 637
II. MNREPA (AVOIDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION) ............. 639
A. Tolling The Statute Of Limitations .................... 639
III. MEPA (AVOIDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION) ............... 645
A. Making The Prima Facie Case ....................... 645
B. Meeting The Standing Requirements ................... 655
IV. CONCLUSION ...................................... 660
I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, the courts focused their attention
predominantly upon resolving procedural issues and interpreting statutes.
For instance, the Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted the statute of
limitations provision contained in the Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act ("NREPA") to determine when the statute of limitations
starts to run in actions for recovery of response activity costs.' The court
concluded that the triggering event was when the landowner took steps to
remedy the damage caused by the environmental hazard.2 Therefore, the
decision may impact the manner in which landowners react to the discovery
I Assistant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law; B.A., Summa Cum
Laude, Grambling State University, 1983; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1988; M.P.A.,
Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, 1989; L.L.M., Energy & Environmental
Law, University of Houston School of Law, 1997; Legal Fellow, Conservation Law
Foundation, 1991-1993.
1. Federated Ins. Co. vs. Oakland County Road Commission, 263 Mich. App. 62, 687
N.W.2d 329 (2004).
2. Id. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 333.
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of environmental contamination on their properties.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in National Wildlife Federation v.
Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., also clarified the issue of standing.3 This
decision is important because it has the potential to impact environmental
law cases filed by nonprofit organizations on behalf of their members. In
stressing the importance of the case, the dissenting justice went so far as to
say, "Without standing, a court will not hear a person's complaint-the
doors to the court are closed."4 Both the Michigan Supreme Court and
court of appeals issued opinions dealing with the interaction between the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act ("MEPA") and the Sand Dune
Protection And Management Act ("SDPMA").5
The most significant development during the Survey period was the
courts' treatment of the MEPA. MEPA has been hailed as "the most
fundamental environmental law in Michigan."' Nevertheless, the courts
limited the scope of the statute. In National Wildlife, the court called into
question the validity of the liberal citizen-suit standing provision contained
in MEPA. 7 In Preserve The Dunes I, the court interpreted MEPA in a
manner that may make it more difficult for the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case under the statute.8
The purpose of this article is to analyze several key opinions issued by
the Michigan courts during the Survey period. The specific focus of the
article is upon the impact those cases will have on environmental law in
Michigan.
3. 471 Mich. 608, 684 N.W.2d 800 (2004).
4. 471 Mich. at 658, 684 N.W.2d at 829 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
5. Preserve The Dunes, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Envtl. Quality (Preserve The Dunes
I), 471 Mich. 508, 684 N.W.2d 847 (2004); Preserve The Dunes, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of
Envtl. Quality (Preserve The Dunes II), 264 Mich. App. 257, 690 N.W.2d 487 (2004).
6. James M. Olson & Christopher M. Bzdok, The MEPA Lives In Northern Michigan
AndBeyond, 78 MICH. B.J. 418, 418 (1999).
7. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 657, 684 N.W.2d at 829.
8. Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. 508, 684 N.W.2d 847.
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I. MNREPA9 (AVOIDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION)
A. Tolling The Statute Of Limitations
In Federated Insurance, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed the
properness of the summary disposition motion that the trial court granted.'
To resolve the case, the court had to decide whether the statute of
limitations was tolled in a cost recovery action under the NEPRA. " After
reviewing the statute, the court held that the cause of action accrued and
the statute of limitations began to run when the property owner authorized
construction of an on-site treatment system in order to remediate the soil
contamination that resulted when petroleum was released onto its
property. 2 The court emphasized that the statute of limitations was not
tolled until the property owner discovered that the neighboring landowner
was responsible for some of the soil contamination. 3
The incident leading to the litigation occurred in February of 1988, when
the contents of an underground storage tank spilled onto property owned by
Carl M. Schultz ("Schultz"). 4 As a consequence, the soil on Schultz's
property was polluted by several toxins, including benzene, toluene, ethyl
benzene, and xylenes. 5 A few months after the incident, the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") ordered Schultz to correct
any damage to the environment that may have occurred because of the
seepage.' 6 The road commission owned the land located next to Schultz's
property." During May 1991, the road commission reported a petroleum
9. The Legislature enacted the MNREPA to provide a mechanism for protecting the
environment and natural resources of the state. Benjamin John McCracken, Constitutional
Law-Combating Canadian Trash Under the Guise of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 82
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 59, 78 n. 156 (2004). The statute requires the enforcing agency to
take several actions to protect the environment and natural resources of the state. Id. The
portion of the statute relevant to this case gives the agency the authority "to regulate the
discharge of certain substances into the environment." Id.
10. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 66, 687 N.W.2d at 332.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 333.
13.Id.
14. Id. at 63, 687 N.W.2d at 330.
15. Id. at 63-64, 687 N.W.2d at 330.
16. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 64, 687 N.W.2d at 330.
17.Id.
2006]
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leak to the Michigan State Police Fire Marshall. 18
In the meantime, Schultz responded to the MDNR's mandate in
November 1991 by hiring a contractor to build an on-site treatment system
to remedy the contamination.19 Further, Schultz filed a Site Investigation
Report and a Site Investigation Work Plan with the MDNR in February of
1992.20 Afterwards, Schultz began to operate the on-site treatment
system.2 From 1993 to 1994, Federated Insurance, the company that
insured Schultz's property, investigated in an attempt to discover if any of
the petroleum from the road commission's property had traveled on to
Schultz's property.22 The theory was that some of the contamination on
Schultz's property had been caused by the leak on the road commission's
land.23
Federated's suspicions were confirmed when, in February of 1995, the
MDNR determined that some of the spilled petroleum from the railroad's
property had migrated on to Schultz's property.24 A year later, Federated,
acting as Schultz's subrogee, notified the road commission of its intent to file
a cost recovery action against the commission to be compensated for the
damage caused by the migrating pollution.2 1 In October of 1997, prior to
filing the cost recovery action, Federated tried unsuccessfully to get the
road commission to sign a tolling agreement. 26 After the road commission's
refusal to cooperate, Federated filed suit on November 1, 2000.27 Relying
on the NREPA, Federated sought past and future remediation costs
connected with the environmental damages caused by the petroleum that
had originated on the road commission's property.28
The road commission made a motion for summary disposition
contending that Federated's claim was barred by the statute of limitations
set forth in NREPA. 29 The relevant portion of the statute provided:
18. Id. at 64, 687 N.W.2d at 331.
19. Id. at 64, 687 N.W.2d at 330.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 64, 687 N.W.2d at 331.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id:
28. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 64, 687 N.W.2d at 331.
29. Id. at 65, 687 N.W.2d at 331.
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Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), the limitation period
for filing actions under this part is as follows:
(a) For the recovery of response activity costs and natural
resources damages pursuant to section 20126a(l)(a),(b) or (c),
within 6 years of initiation of physical on-site construction activities
for the remedial action selected or approved by the
department at a facility .... 0
In supporting its motion, the road commission argued that the running of
the statute of limitations was triggered in 1991 by Schultz's construction of
the on-site treatment system.31 According to the road commission, in order
to comply with NREPA's mandated statute of limitations, Schultz/Federated
only had until 1997 to file a cost recovery action.32 Federated opposed the
road commission's summary disposition motion claiming that the statute of
limitations did not start to run until February of 1995 when the company
obtained proof that the petroleum from the road commission's property had
migrated to Schultz's property.33 Hence, Federated alleged that its claim
would not have been barred until 2001.1' The trial court agreed with the
road commission's position and granted its motion for summary
disposition.35 As a result, Federated filed an appeal. 36
In order to resolve the matter, the Michigan Court of Appeals
interpreted the statute.37 The court started its analysis by reviewing the plain
language of the statute. In particular, the court reviewed the definitional
provision of the statute and found several sections to be relevant.39
One pertinent section defined "remedial action" to include. . . "cleanup,
removal, containment, isolation, destruction, or treatment of a hazardous
substance released or threatened to be released into the environment,
30. Mica COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 324.20140(1)(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
31. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 65, 687 N.W.2d at 331.
32. Id.
33.Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 66, 687 N.W.2d at 331.
37. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 67, 687 N.W.2d at 332.
38. Id. at 67, 687 N.W.2d at 332-33.
39. Id at 67-68, 687 N.W.2d at 332.
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monitoring, maintenance, or the taking of other action that may be
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate injury to the public health, safety,
or welfare, or to the environment." The court interpreted this section of
the statute to define remedial action in a broad manner.4 Thus, it appears
that any action that is taken to "prevent, minimize, or mitigate injury to the
public health, safety, or welfare, or the environment" is considered to be
remediation for purposes of starting the statute of limitations to run.42 A
section of the statute also provided that "'[r]emedial action plan' means a
work plan for performing remedial action under this part."'
In another germane section, "response activity" is broadly defined to
include any action taken "to protect the public health, safety, or welfare, or
the environment or the natural resources." In addition, "health
assessments or health effect studies carried out under the supervision, or
with the approval of, the department of public health and enforcement
actions related to any response activity" are also considered to be response
activities.45 The final section that the court referenced stated, "'[r]esponse
activity costs' or 'costs of response activity' means all costs incurred in
taking or conducting a response activity, including enforcement costs."
6
Based upon the applicable definitions contained in the statute, the court
held that the on-site construction constituted remedial action.47 Thus, the
statute of limitations started to run the day Schultz started building the
treatment system. 48 Federated had six years from that time to bring an
action against the road commission. Consequently, since Federated allowed
more than that amount of time to pass before filing suit, Federated's action
was barred by the statute of limitations.49
In reaching its decision, the court responded to several arguments made
40. Id. at 67,687 N.W.2d at 332 (citing the Michigan Natural Resources Environmental
Protection Act (NREPA) § 20101(cc)).
41. Id. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 332-33.
42. Id.
43. FederatedInsurance, 263 Mich. App. at 67, 687 N.W.2d at 332 (citing NREPA §
20101(dd)).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing NREPA § 20101 (ee)).
46. Id. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 332 (citing NREPA § 20101(ff)).
47. Id. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 333.
48. Id. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 333.
49. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 333.
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by Federated.5"
First, Federated contended that the statute of limitations did not start to
run until the MDNR had approved the final remedial action plan in 1993. 51
In rejecting that argument, the court opined that an action to remedy an
environmental hazard does not have to be approved by the MDNR to be
considered remedial.12 The court reasoned that, since the Legislature
referred to both remedial action and remedial action plan, it intended for the
actions to be treated as separate incidents.53 Therefore, Federated's
remedial action activities undertaken in 1991 were separate from the
remedial action plan approved by the MDNR in 1993.5' Hence, the former
triggered the statute of limitations, so Federated could not have filed a timely
action after 1997.55
Federated also argued that the statute of limitations did not start to run
until it had completed the on-site construction activities in 1997. 5' The court
concluded that this argument was without merit.57 In determining when the
statute of limitations starts to run, the focus is upon when the remedial
action activities were started, not when they were completed.5" Hence, a
plaintiff cannot sit on his or her rights until he or she decides to finish
remedying the environmental hazard.
Finally, Federated asserted that the court should apply the common law
discovery rule to decide when the claim accrued.59 Application of the
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 68, 687 N.W.2d at 333.
56.Id.
57.Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 69, 687 N.W.2d at 333. "Statutes of limitations generally provide that the
limitations period begins to run when a claim or an injury 'accrues' or 'arises.' Traditionally,
courts have held that a claim 'accrues' for statute of limitations purposes at the moment
when the plaintiff's rights are violated-that is, at the time of the wrongful act or event.
Under the discovery rule, however, a plaintiffs claim does not accrue until the plaintiff
knows, or in the exerciseof reasonable diligence should know, of certain facts underlyingthe
claim." James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule And The Continuing Violation Doctrine As
Exceptions To The Statute Of Limitations For Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 589, 593 (Summer 1996).
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discovery rule would have tolled the statute of limitations until Federated
discovered or should have discovered that the injury to the property was
partially caused by the road commission. 6' The court gave two reasons for
rejecting that argument. First, the Court noted that section 20140(l)(a) of
the statute did not contain any language indicating that the Michigan
Legislature meant to toll the running of the statute of limitations until the
plaintiff could discover the existence of additional releases of contaminants
from other sources.6' In fact, the court stated that it was reluctant to imply
a discovery rule into one provision of the statute because the Legislature's
express inclusion of a discovery rule in another portion of the statute
demonstrated that the Legislature knew how to impose a discovery rule
when it felt that action was appropriate.62
The contested statute did not expressly provide for the application of the
discovery rule. Nonetheless, courts often adopt the doctrine in situations
where equity dictates that the plaintiff be afforded an adequate opportunity
to discover the cause of the complained of injury.63 Applying the discovery
rule does not conflict with the main purpose of having a statute of
limitations, to prevent a plaintiff from "sitting" on his or her rights,64 since
the discovery rule is usually permitted in cases where the plaintiff is
unaware of his or her rights. The discovery rule would be especially
appropriate in environmental cases because the source of pollution is often
difficult to pinpoint.65
The decision in this case may have an adverse affect on plaintiffs and
on the environment. Plaintiffs may be disadvantaged because, once
plaintiffs have started remediation, potential defendants may take steps to
make their culpability difficult to discover. To avoid the expiration of the
statute of limitations, persons may be hesitant to take remedial actions that
will benefit the environment. To preserve their claims, persons may spend
more time investigating the remediation. This goes against public policy
60. Federated Insurance, 263 Mich. App. at 69, 687 N.W.2d at 333.
61. Id.
62. Id. NREPA §20140(1)(c) expressly provides that the limitations period for bringing
an action for civil fines under the NREPA is three years after the discovery of the violation.
63. "Tolling is an equitable means of suspendingapplication of a statute of limitations
where a claim has already accrued and the limitations period has already started to run."
MacAyeal, supra note 59, at 597.
64. Id. at 592.
65. Id. at 589.
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because the law should encourage persons to mitigate environmental
damage by starting remediation actions as soon as possible. Persons may
put off remediation as long as the statute permits if they suspect that
someone else is partially responsible for the environmental damage.
III. MEPA (AVOIDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION)
Similar to the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),66 MEPA
is an umbrella statute enacted to provide a mechanism for protecting the
Michigan environment. Professor Joseph Sax played a major role in drafting
the language that was ultimately adopted into MEPA.67 One of the primary
purposes of MEPA is to provide private citizens with a method of utilizing
the courts to protect the natural resources and the environment of the
state.61 The cases analyzed in this section address the procedural hurdles
plaintiffs have to overcome to get their day in court: establishing a prima
facie case and meeting the standing requirements.
A. Making The Prima Facie Case
In the 2004 Survey period the author Kurt M. Brauer analyzed the
potential impact of Preserve The Dunes Inc. v. Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality.69 Since that time, the case has been remanded and
the issues have finally been resolved.7" Thus, the case is included in this
Survey.
The following is a recap of the relevant facts of the case. In 1991,
TechniSand ("Tech") bought land from the owner of a sand mining
operation.7 As a part of the deal, Tech received that operator's sand
66. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370d.
67. Heather Terry, Still Standing But "Teed Up": The Michigan Environmental
Protection Act's Citizen Suit Provision Afier National Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs,
2005 Mica. ST. L. REv. 1297, 1302-04 (2005).
68. Joseph Castrilli, Environmental Rights Statutes In The UnitedStates And Canada:
Comparing The Michigan And Ontario Experiences, 9 VILL. ENVTL L.J. 349, 360-61
(1998).
69. 471 Mich. 508, 684 N.W.2d 847.
70. Kurt M. Brauer, Annual Survey of Michigan Law: June 1, 2002-May 31, 2003, 50
WAYNE L. REV. 565, 570-72 (2004).
71. Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. at 511, 684 N.W.2d at 849.
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mining permit.72 The permit to mine was due to expire in two years. 73 Tech
also purchased the Nadeau Site Expansion Area ("NSE"), an area that had
been labeled as a "critical dune" area pursuant to the Sand Dune Mining
Act ("SDMA"). 74 Tech did not have a permit to remove sand from the
NSE. 75 Under section 324.63702(1) of the SDMA, no one would be granted
a permit to mine in critical dune areas after July 5, 1989.76 However, after
that date, operators seeking to renew or amend previously issued sand
mining permits were still eligible to receive permission to mine in those
areas.
77
In addition, an operator who had a valid sand mining permit was eligible
to amend that permit to include adjacent property that he or she owned or
had the right to mine prior to July 5, 1989.71 In 1994, relying on the second
exception, Tech applied for an amended permit to expand its mining
operation onto the NSE.79 A year later, after concluding that Tech had
purchased the sand mining operation after July 5, 1989, the Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR") determined that Tech was not entitled to an
amended permit based upon the statutory exception.8" In that same year, as
a result of an executive order, the regulation of sand mining became the
responsibility of the Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ").8'
In May 1996, after the DEQ assumed its role as the regulating agency,
Tech made some changes to its application and requested a modified mining
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.63701-63714.
75. Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. at 511, 684 N.W.2d at 849.
76. Id. The two exceptions to the prohibition were the following: "(a) The operator
seeks to renew or amend a sand dune mining permit that was issued prior to July 5, 1989,
subject to the criteria and standards applicable to a renewal or amendatory application; (b)
The operator holds a sand dune mining permit issued pursuant to § 63704 and is seeking to
amend the mining permit to include land that is adjacent to property the operator is
permitted to mine, and prior to July 5, 1989, the operator owned the land or owned rights
to mine dune sand in the land for which the operator seeks an amended permit." MicH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.63702(l)(a) and (b).
77. Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. at 511, 684 N.W.2d at 849.
78. Id. at 512, 684 N.W.2d at 849.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id
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permit.82 DEQ held a public hearing on the matter and granted Tech's
request on November 25, 1996.83 Consequently, Tech started mining the
NSE area." Preserve The Dunes, Inc., a local citizens' group, filed suit
against Tech and DEQ. 5 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief based upon two allegations. 6 First, the plaintiffs claimed that DEQ
violated the Michigan Environmental Protection Act ("MEPA") by issuing
a permit to an ineligible operator. 7 The plaintiffs based their case against
the DEQ on the fact that Tech did not meet either of the exceptions stated
in the SDMA.88 The plaintiffs reasoned that, by ignoring the mandates of
the SDMA and issuing a sand mining permit to Tech, the DEQ violated
MUEPA.89 Second, the plaintiffs contended that Tech's proposed mining
project violated the dictates of MEPA.90
In response to the plaintiffs' legal action, Tech and DEQ moved for
summary disposition alleging that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations.9 The Circuit Court judge rejected their arguments and denied
their motion.92 After that Circuit Court judge retired, the plaintiffs moved for
summary disposition.93 The new judge held that the plaintiffs' SDMA's
claim was time-barred.94 Nevertheless, the judge concluded that the
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case95 with regards to its MEPA
82. Id.
83. Preserve The Dunes , 471 Mich. at 512, 684 N.W.2d at 849.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. at 512, 684 N.W.2d at 850.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 513, 684 N.W.2d at 850.
94. Id.
95. Preserve The Dunes I, 471 Mich. at 513, 684 N.W.2d at 850. According to the
Michigan Supreme Court, "[t]o prevail on a MEPA claim, the plaintiff must make a 'prima
facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has polluted, impaired, or destroyed or is
likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other natural resources, or the public
trust in these resources.... .' MCL 324.1703(1). The defendant may rebut the plaintiff's
showing with contrary evidence or raise an affirmative defense that (1) there is no feasible
and prudent alternative to the conduct and (2) the 'conduct is consistent with the promotion
of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's concern with protecting
2006]
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claim independent of any alleged violation of the SDMA. After a trial on the
merits, the circuit court ruled that the plaintiffs' prima facie case had been
rebutted by the defendants because Tech's proposed conduct would not
impair or destroy any natural resources.96 Thus, the court issued a judgment
of "no cause of action.9 7 In justifying its decision, the court reasoned that
"any adverse impact on the natural resources which will result from the
sand mining will not rise to the level of impairment or destruction of natural
resources within the meaning of MEPA.' 8
The Michigan appellate court reversed the circuit court and remanded
the case so the circuit court could enter an order granting summary
disposition in favor of the plaintiffs.99 In reaching its decision, the appellate
court determined that Tech did not qualify for a permit under the criteria set
out in the SDMA because the company purchased the NES after July 5,
1989. 00 Thus, the court concluded that, by proving a violation of the
SDMA, the plaintiffs had established a prima facie MEPA violation, and the
defendants appealed the matter to the Michigan Supreme Court.'0 '
The Michigan Supreme Court had to decide if the plaintiffs had
established a prima facie MEPA violation. The court analyzed two aspects
of the plaintiffs' case. The court first sought to determine if the plaintiffs
had proven a per se violation of MEPA relying upon DEQ's actions."'2
Then, the Court evaluated whether the plaintiffs had proven an independent
MEPA violation based upon Tech's mining practices.0 3 According to the
court, a violation of a statute that contains a pollution control standard"° is
Michigan's natural resources. Id." Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. at 514, 684 N.W.2d at
850.
96. Id. at 513, 684 N.W.2d at 850.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. at 513, 684 N.W.2d at 850.
102. Preserve The Dunes I, 471 Mich. at 518, n5, 684 N.W. 2d, at 852 n5.
103. The Court concluded that this issue was not ripe for review since "the Court of
Appeals never reached PTD's claim that TechniSand's mining operation violates
MEPA .. " Thus, the case was remanded to the Appellate Court for resolution of the
matter. Id. at 521.
104. A pollution control standard is a standard that is designed to prevent pollution or
impairment of a natural resource. Olson, supra note 6, at 420.
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a per se violation of MEPA. '05 Consequently, to make a prima facie case
of a MEPA violation, all the plaintiff has to do is to prove that the
defendant's conduct violated a pollution control standard set forth in an
environmental statute. 6 Hence, in order to evaluate the appellate court's
decision, the court had to decide if the SDMA contained a pollution control
standard. To make that determination, the court reviewed the plain language
of the statute. ,7
The language of the SDMA indicated that the only operator eligible for
a permit was one who satisfied the dictates of one of the exceptions to the
SMDA ban on mining in critical dune areas.0 8 Thus, in determining whether
or not to grant a request for a mining permit, the only thing DEQ had to
decide was if the operator's situation fit into one of the statutory
exceptions.0 9 If it did not, the operator was not eligible for a mining
permit."0 In deciding whether or not to award the permit, the DEQ did not
have to consider the applicant's proposed conduct."' The environmental
impact of the applicant's proposed conduct would not become an issue until
after the DEQ had determined that the applicant was eligible for a permit
based upon the applicant status as either a past owner or operator. Since
the operator's conduct was not a determining factor in his or her eligibility
for a sand dune mining permit, the court concluded that the statue did not
contain a pollution control standard." 2 Thus, DEQ could give an ineligible
operator a sand dune mining permit and still not be in violation of MEPA. 3
Once the court determined that a violation of the SDMA could not be
the basis for a per se MEPA violation, it had to decide if the plaintiffs had
established a prima facie case for a MEPA violation independent of the
SDMA. The question the court had to ask was whether Tech's proposed
105. Preserve The Dunes I, 471 Mich. at 516, 684 N.W.2d at 851-852 (citing MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.170(2)(b)).
106. See e.g, Nemeth v. Abonmarche Development Inc., 457 Mich. 16, 576 N.W. 2d
641 (1998) (holding "that a violation of the soil erosion and sedimentation control act
("SESCA"), MCL 324.9101 et. seq. may establish a plaintiffs prima facie showing under
MEPA because the SESCA contains a pollution control standard.").
107. Preserve The Dunes I, 471 Mich. at 515, 684 N.W.2d at 851.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Preserve The Dunes 1, 471 Mich. at 516, 684 N.W.2d at 852.
113. Id.
2006)
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mining project violated MEPA. In order to answer that question, the Court
evaluated the connection between the SDMA and MEPA. "4 The SDMA
prohibited the DEQ from issuing an amended permit to an applicant if the
action the applicant wants to take "is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the
air, water or other natural resources or the public trust in those resources
as provided by part 17 [of MEPA]."'15 The court interpreted that language
as preventing the DEQ from granting any permits for conduct that violated
MEPA. 1 6
Since there was no pollution control standard set forth in the SDMA,
the court had to apply the standard from MEPA. The test for determining
if a defendant's conduct violates MEPA is "whether defendant's conduct
will, in fact, pollute, impair, or destroy a natural resource."' 7 The court
decided that the appellate court acted in error because it presumed that the
SDMA contained a pollution control criterion and that Tech's conduct
violated that standard." 8 Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the
plaintiffs had established a per se violation of MEPA. As a consequence,
the appellate court did not decide if Tech's conduct violated MEPA. "9 The
Michigan Supreme Court opined that the appellate court could not have
completely resolved the matter without fully evaluating the environmental
impact of the mining project because MEPA is solely concerned with
adverse conduct. 2° In order for an actor to violate MEPA, his actions must
conflict with the mandates of the statute. 2' The court ruled that the trial
court had correctly attempted to assess the environmental impact of Tech's
actions.'22 Thus, the court remanded the case to the appellate court in order
for that court to evaluate the Trial Court's decision with regards to Tech's
alleged violation of MEPA. '23
Justice Kelly wrote a forceful dissent attacking the reasoning of the
majority opinion. The dissenting justice accused the majority of striking "a
114. Id. at 515, 685 N.W.2d at 851
115. Id.
116. Id. at 515-16, 684 N.W.2d at 851.
117. Id. at 518, 684 N.W.2d at 853.
118. Preserve The Dunes I, 471 Mich. at 516-17, 684 N.W.2d at 852.
119. Id. at 518, 684 N.W.2d at 852.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 521, 684 N.W.2d at 854.
122. Id. at 518, 684 N.W.2d at 852.
123. Id. at 521, 684 N.W.2d at 854.
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devastating blow to Michigan's environmental law.' 1 24 Justice Kelly
supported her contention by emphasizing that Tech engaged in illegal mining
of the sand dune because it was undisputed that the company did not meet
the statutory requirements. 25 According to Justice Kelly, the majority did
nothing to take the DEQ to task for issuing a permit in violation of the
mandates of the SDMA. 126 The appellate court's decision should have been
affirmed to remedy the blatant violation of the statute on the part of the
DEQ and Tech. Further, the dissent noted that "the majority's decision
subverts the purposes of the sand dunes mining act by incorrectly insulating
the DEQ's permit decision from scrutiny under the environmental protection
act.
1 27
On remand, relying upon the majority's reasoning, the appellate court
decided that the trial court correctly determined that the SDMA did not
contain a pollution control standard, so the plaintiffs could not establish a per
se MEPA violation.'28 At trial, the plaintiffs argued that the pollution control
standards included in the Sand Dune Protection Management Act
("SDPMA") 129 were applicable to the SDMA. Therefore, the plaintiffs
asked the court to conclude that any breach of those standards was a per
se MEPA violation. In one section of the SDPMA, "' the Michigan
Legislature emphasized the uniqueness of the sand dunes and the benefits
they provided to the state. ' The plaintiffs wanted the court to read a
pollution control standard into that section because the Legislature would
want to control pollution in the critical dune areas of the state to protect
such a precious resource. 13 2
In addition, the plaintiffs' reference to another section of the statute
seemed to indicate that the local government, as protector of the sand
124. Preserve The Dunes I, 471 Mich. at 525, 684 N.W.2d at 856 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 527, 684 N.W.2d at 857.
128. Preserve The Dunes 11, 264 Mich. App. at 263, 690 N.W.2d at 491.
129. The SDMPA deals with regulating activities in "critical dune areas" and the
SDMA deals with regulating sand mining in other areas. Office of Geological Survey, Sand
Dune Mining in Michigan Presentation, Jan. 25, 2002 at www.michigan.gov (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005).
130. MICa COMP. LAwS ANN. § 324.35302(a).
131. Id.
132. Preserve The Dunes II, 264 Mich. App. at 263, 690 N.W.2d at 492.
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dunes, had the responsibility to control pollution in the area.'33 The plaintiffs
urged the court to interpret the statute to include some type of pollution
control standard because the language in one section of the statute reflected
the Legislature's desire that the sand dunes be preserved for the benefit of
future generations.'34
The trial court cited several reasons for rejecting the plaintiffs' pollution
control arguments. First, the trial court determined that the section dealing
with the role of the local government had nothing to do with establishing a
pollution control standard.'35 The trial court also noted that the final section
referenced by the plaintiffs did not apply to sand dune mining permits
because sand mining was expressly exempt from that section of the
SDMA. 36 Finally, the trial court acknowledged that the first section of the
statute the plaintiffs relied upon should be considered when evaluating the
defendants' conduct.'37 Nevertheless, the court failed to read a pollution
control standard into the SDMA. 138
After rejecting the plaintiffs' per se argument, the trial court addressed
the issue of Tech's independent violation of MEPA. The court had to
determine if Tech's mining practices had violated or would violate MEPA.
The court evaluated the case relying upon the criteria set out in the Portage
case. 139 The Portage factors required the court to address the following
issues:
(1) whether the site impacted by Tech's mining operations
contained natural resources that were rare, unique, endangered, or
has historical significance;
(2) whether the natural resources in the impacted area could be
easily replaced;
(3) whether Tech's proposed mining operations would significantly
affect the other natural resources in the area; and
(4) whether a crucial number of animals and plants would be
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 264, 690 N.W.2d at 492.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Preserve The Dunes II, 264 Mich. App. at 264, 690 N.W.2d at 492.
139. Portage v. Kalamazoo Co. Rd., Comm., 136 Mich. App. 276, 355 N.W. 2d 913
(1984).
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directly or incidentally impacted by Tech's proposed mining
operations. 140
Both sides presented expert testimony to assist the trial court in
evaluating the impact of Tech's mining operations. 14' Tech's experts
testified that when the flora in the area was compared with the flora located
in most of the 71,000 acres of critical dune areas in the state, it was found
to be "typical and unexceptional. 14' Thus, it would not be difficult to
replace any flora that might be destroyed by Tech's mining operations.
According to defendants' experts, Tech's proposed actions would not
substantially impact the water table and inland dune ecosystem because
they were restricted by the permit 43 and would be carried out in
compliance with the mining and reclamation plan.'" Tech won the battle of
the experts because the trial court decided to based its decision on the
testimony given by Tech's expert.145
After reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court concluded that
Tech's proposed mining activities did not violate MEPA. 146 The trial court
reasoned that the proposed removal of sand from the 71 acres 47 would not
adversely impact a natural resource that was scarce or had the potential to
become scarce. 48 Moreover, the court opined that Tech's mining
operations would not have a significant impact on critical sand dune areas
in the state because the site it wanted to mine represented a very small
portion (1/10 of 1%) of the critical dune area in Michigan. 149 The court also
determined that the ban on future sand dune mining was sufficient
140. Preserve The Dunes II, 264 Mich. App. at 262 n.3,690 N.W.2d at 491 n.3 (citing
Portage, 136 Mich. App. At 282).
141. Preserve The Dunes II, 264 Mich. App. at 266, 690 N.W.2d at 493.
142. Id. at 260, 690 N.W.2d at 490.
143. Tech granted the DEQ a permanent conservation easement to maintain the highest
dune crest and distancing mining operations from an adjacent wetland and threatened plants.
Id. at 261 n.2, 690 N.W.2d at 490 n.2.
144. Id. at 260-61, 690 N.W.2d at 490.
145. Id. at 267, 690 N.W.2d at 493.
146. Id. at 262, 690 N.W.2d at 490-91.
147. The site at issue contained 126.5 acres, but only 71.6 acres of the property was
designated as "critical dune area." Preserve The Dunes II, 264 Mich. App. at 260, 690
N.W.2d at 490.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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protection for the natural resource. 150 Consequently, the court held that the
critical dune areas as a whole in the state would not be destroyed or
impaired within the meaning of MEPA. 15'
At the appellate level, the plaintiffs alleged several errors on the part of
the trial court. Plaintiffs contended that, when deciding the
impairment/destruction issue, the trial court improperly considered how
Tech's project would impact the total statewide critical dune area.152
According to the plaintiffs, the trial court should have evaluated the
proposed mining project's impact solely on the site involved in the case
because each critical dune area is entitled to individual protection from
impairment and destruction. 53
The appellate court determined that the trial court correctly rejected the
plaintiffs' argument because the Michigan Legislature intended for courts
to evaluate the total environmental impact of sand dune mining
operations. 54 That intent was evident by the fact that, in order to obtain a
sand dune mining permit, the statute required an operator to prepare an
environmental impact statement ("EIS") dealing with "the effect of the
proposed activity on the immediate area and on other natural resources,
including the groundwater, air, flora, fauna, and wildlife habitats."15 In
addition, the language of the SDPMA used the singular term natural
resource when referring to the critical dune areas in the state. '1 6
The plaintiffs also claimed that the trial court erred when it applied the
Portage factors to the case." 7 In light of prior precedent, the plaintiffs
contended that the trial court should have used the standard established by
the Legislature: "critical dune areas are unique and irreplaceable."'58 The
appellate court held that the correct standard was the one stated in the
SDMA. 9 The court concluded that those statutory factors were similar to
150. Id. The trial court stated, "this site is the last acreage within critical dune areas in
the entire state in which sand mining could be authorized by the DEQ" because critical dune
mining was banned after July 5, 1989. Id.
151. Id. at 265, 690 N.W.2d at 492.
152. Id. at 263, 690 N.W.2d at 491.
153. Preserve The Dunes 11, 264 Mich. App. at 266, 690 N.W.2d at 493..
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 267, 690 N.W.2d at 494.
158. Id.
159. Preserve The Dunes II, 264 Mich. App. at 267, 690 N.W.2d at 494.
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the Portage factors; therefore, the trial court did not act erroneously when
it relied upon the Portage factors to resolve the case. 160
Although MEPA is the state's version of the National Environmental
Policy Act, the court does not appear to give it as comprehensive an
application because an actor can violate an environmental statute without
violating MEPA. The Preserve The Dunes decisions limit the scope of the
statute. The impact of the decisions will make it harder for plaintiffs to avoid
summary dispositions in MEPA cases. Even if a plaintiff is able to muster
the resources to prove that a defendant has violated an environmental
statute, that may not be enough for the plaintiff to get a trial on the merits.
If the plaintiff is unable to show that the environmental statute contains
a pollution control standard, he or she will have to prove an independent
violation of MEPA. It may not be easy for a plaintiff to prove that a statute
contains a pollution control standard because there does not appear to be an
objective test for determining when a pollution control standard exists. In the
Preserve The Dunes cases, the courts did not articulate clear criteria for
identifying a pollution control standard. This decision has the potential to
take MEPA plaintiffs back to the obstacles they faced in the early 1980s.
At that time, MEPA plaintiffs had to satisfy a high standard to meet their
prima facie case and avoid summary dispositions. 6 '
B. Meeting The Standing Requirements
Under the provisions of the MEPA, "any person" can file an action "for
declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the
air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these
resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction."' 6 2 Relying upon the
statute, the National Wildlife Federation And Upper Peninsula Wildlife
Council ("NWF"), a non-profit organization, filed suit on behalf of their
members, in the Ingham Circuit Court.'63 The purpose of the action was to
obtain a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent
the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company ("Cleveland Cliffs") and its partner,
Empire Iron Mining Partnership ("Empire"), from expanding their mining
160. Id. at 268, 690 N.W.2d at 494.
161. Olson, supra note 6, at 419.
162. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701(1).
163. The casewas eventually moved to the Marquette Circuit Court.National Wildlife,
471 Mich. at 611, 684 N.W.2d at 804.
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operations at the Empire Mine in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. "
Prior to filing its lawsuit, the NWF sought a hearing before the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ") to contest the agency's
issuance of a mining permit to Cleveland Cliffs.'65 After the hearing referee
dismissed its complaint for lack of standing, the NWF appealed to the
Marquette Circuit Court. 66 The circuit court affirmed the referee's decision
and the Michigan Court of Appeals declined to hear the NWF's appeal. 167
Thus, as indicated above, the NWF turned to the Ingham Circuit Court for
relief'68 The circuit court concluded that NWF did not have standing to
bring the case. 69 After reviewing the plain language of MEPA, the
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision. 7 The
appellate court reasoned that the NWF had standing because the statute
allowed "any person" to file an action to protect the environment. 7' The
matter came before the Michigan Supreme Court for the limited purpose of
resolving the standing issue. 72
When analyzing if the NWF had standing to bring the case, the
Michigan Supreme Court assumed that the organization would have
standing under MEPA. Nonetheless, the court focused upon the
Legislature's authority to grant standing through the statute. Thus, the issue
considered by the court was framed as follows: "whether the Legislature
can by statute confer standing on a party who does not satisfy the judicial
test for standing.' ' 73
In order to address the issue, the Court assessed the legislative branch's
ability to expand the judicial power. Historically, the courts had restricted
the exercise of judicial power to situations involving injured parties. By
passing a statue permitting "any person" to file an action before the court,
the Michigan Legislature attempted to broaden the judicial power to include
circumstances involving non-injured parties.'74 The separation of powers
164. Id. at 611-12, 684 N.W.2d at 804-05.
165. Id. at 611, 684 N.W.2d at 804.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 612,684 N.W.2d at 805.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 612, 684 N.W.2d at 805.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 616, 684 N.W.2d at 807.
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doctrine prohibits one branch of government from delegating its
responsibility to another branch. Therefore, the Legislature does not have
the authority to expand the judiciary branch's responsibilities beyond those
mandated by the constitution.175
In reaching its decision, the court spent a substantial portion of its
opinion discussing the authority given to the three branches of government
by the Michigan Constitution.176 According to the court, the purpose of the
judiciary is to provide a forum for the resolution of disputes involving
persons who have suffered a "particularized" injury that is "distinct from
that of the general public."'7 7 Hence, the courts should only become
involved in a situation when an individual alleges a specific injury caused by
the legislative branch's making of a law or the executive branch's
enforcement of a law. 7 It is not the job of the courts to monitor the actions
of those governmental branches.' The purpose of limiting the exercise of
judicial power to cases involving "particularized" injuries is to avoid having
the judiciary becoming embroiled in public policy debates.' The Michigan
Constitution gave the legislative branch the responsibility to regulate public
policy through the passage of laws. That branch cannot delegate its duties
to the judicial branch.'
Consequently, to have standing to bring an action, a person must meet
the criteria established by the court in Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of
Comm 'rs. '8 In order to comply with the mandates of Lee, a person has to
175. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 613, 684 N.W.2d at 806-07.
176. Id. at 613, 684 N.W.2d at 805. "The Michigan Constitution provides that the
Legislature is to exercise the 'legislative power' of the state, Const. 1963, art. 4, § 1, the
Governor is to exercise the 'executive power', Const. 1963, art. 5, § 1, and the judiciary is
to exercise the 'judicial power,' Const. 1963, art. 6, § 1." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 615, 684 N.W.2d at 806.
179. Id.
180. ldat 615,684N.W.2dat 807. Thecourt states: "Absent a 'particularized' injury,
there would be little that would stand in the way of the judicial branch becoming intertwined
in every matter of public debate. If a taxpayer, for example, opposed the closing of a tax
'loophole' by the Legislature, the legislation might be challenged in court." Id.
181. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 613, 684 N.W.2d at 805-06. "The powers of
government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person
exercising powers of one branch shall exercisepowers properly belongingto another branch
except as expressly provided in this constitution." Id.
182. 464 Mich. 726, 629 N.W.2d 900 (2001). The court responded to the dissent's
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prove at least three things. First, the person must show that he or she has
experienced an "injury in fact."'' 3 To meet that burden, a person must
demonstrate "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent, not 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical.""" 4 Second, the person must establish that his or her injury
was caused by the action being challenged.'85 Finally, the person must
prove that a favorable decision by the court is likely to remedy his or her
injury.'86 If a person does not meet the Lee standing requirements, the
person cannot rely upon a statute to have standing to bring a case. Thus, in
the case at issue, even though MEPA permits "any person" to bring a cause
of action to enforce the statute, the courts will not recognize the claim
unless the NWF satisfies the requirements enumerated in Lee.'87
After clarifying the relevant law, the court applied it to the facts of the
NWF case. The court noted that non-profit organizations like the NWF can
only bring suit on behalf of their members if the members would have
standing to sue as individuals.' In order to meet the standard set out in
Lee, the NWF had to assert that the members of the organization had
suffered either "an actual injury or an imminent injury."'89
The NWF submitted affidavits from three members who lived near the
mine.' 90 The members contended that they participated in recreational
activities in the area, that they intended to continue to use the area for those
purposes, and that they worried that expanding the mine operation would
"irreparably harm their recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the area."'9'
criticismof its decision to rely upon the standing requirements set forth in Lee instead of the
standing provision included in MEPA by stating that the Lee rule is not judge-made law
because it resulted from an interpretation of the Michigan Constitution. National Wildlife,
471 Mich. at 633, 684 N.W.2d at 816. The standards stated in the Lee case parallel the
federal standing requirements articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
(1992).
183. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 628, 684 N.W.2d at 814.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 628-29, 684 N.W.2d at 814.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 629, 684 N.W.2d at 814.
188. Id.
189. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 629, 684 N.W.2d at 814.
190. Id. at 630, 684 N.W.2d at 814.
191. Id. NWF members also claimed that they used the area near the mine to bird
watch, canoe, bike, hike, ski, fish and farm. Id.
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One member who owned property next to the mine claimed that, as a result
of the mining activities, the local aquifer had dropped too lOW. 92
Consequently, he had to dig a deeper well because the original one was
almost dry.' 93 The NWF also submitted an affidavit from an expert to
support its case. '94 In his affidavit, the expert explained the potential impact
expanding the mining operations would have on groundwater flow, stream
flow, water quality, birds, fish and plants.'95 Based upon the evidence
presented by NWF, the court held that the organization had satisfied the
standing requirements listed in Lee.'96 Thus, the court determined that it
was not necessary to address the constitutionality of the MEPA standing
provision.'97
Even though the plaintiffs prevailed in the case, Justice Weaver
dissented. 9 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Weaver accused the majority
of disregarding the mandate of the people. " According to Justice Weaver,
the Legislature passed MEPA and included a citizen suit provision in it
because the people of Michigan constitutionally mandated that the
Legislature take steps to protect the environment. 20 Justice Weaver
indicated that the majority relied too much upon federal constitutional
principles and ignored the differences between the Michigan Constitution
and the United States Constitution.2"' The majority's preoccupation with
federal law is evidenced by the fact that the standing requirements set forth
in the Lee case are identical to the ones mandated by the United States
192. Id.
193. Id. at 630, 684 N.W.2d at 815.
194. Id. at 631, 684 N.W.2d at 815.
195. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 631, 684 N.W.2d at 815.
196. Id. at 632, 684 N.W.2d at 815.
197. Id. In deciding not to reach the constitutional issue, the court noted, ".
constitutional issues-whether easy or difficult-are to be avoided where a case can be
resolved adequately on non-constitutional grounds." Id.
198. Id. at 651, 684 N.W.2d at 826 (Weaver, J., dissenting). Justice Weaver stated, "I
concur in only the result of the majority opinion. I would hold that plaintiffs havingstanding
under MCL § 324.1701 (1) of the Michigan environmental protection act (MEPA) to bring
an action to enjoin mining activities that plaintiffs allege will irreparably harm natural
resources." Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 656, 684 N.W.2d at 829.
201. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 662-63, 684 N.W.2d at 832.
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Supreme Court in Lujan. °2
Further, Justice Weaver asserted that, since the authority of the
Legislature to authorize citizen suits through MEPA had been unquestioned
for thirty years, the majority's opinion is in conflict with past Michigan case
law.2"3 Justice Weaver's main concern appears to be the belief that the
majority opinion has set the stage to declare the MEPA citizen-suit standing
provision to be unconstitutional.2" Justice Weaver reasoned that, since the
majority concluded that the Legislature cannot pass a statute that relaxes
the standing requirements enumerated in Lee, it is inevitable that the court
will determine that the standing requirement in MEPA violates the Michigan
Constitution.0 5
Despite the dissent's predictions, the result of National Wildlife will
probably not have a great impact on Michigan environmental law. Persons
who utilize the MEPA citizen suit to file actions to protect the environment
will usually be able to prove some type of injury in fact. Thus, they will have
standing to bring a MEPA claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout the Survey period, the primary environmental law cases
dealt with procedural issues. This article has attempted to put those legal
decisions into context.
202. For a critical discussion of the Lujan case, See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " And Article 11I, 91 MICa L. REv. 163 (1992).
203. National Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 652, 684 N.W.2d at 826.
204. Id. at 671, 684 N.W.2d at 837.
205. Id.
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